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Wage Flexibility, Menu Costs, and Price Level Stickiness
by
A lfred M aussner
I consider the relation between wage determination and price level stickiness 
along the lines of the menu costs approach. I allow for flexible wages and a 
variable fraction of firms adjusting their prices in response to aggregate demand 
shocks. Strategie substitutability between firms arises for empirically plausible 
parameter values implying (1) a price elasticity o f aggregate supply which is 
neither zero nor infinite and (2) unrealistically high menu costs. Efficiency 
wages as well as fixed wages imply that either all firms do or do not adjust 
prices. In both cases, menu costs required for fixed prices are quite small. 
(JEL: E24, E42, L16)
1. Introduction
Am ong the stylized facts o f business cycles is the positive correlation  between 
real and nom inal G N P. K eynesian econom ics a ttribu tes this finding to sticky 
wages and product prices. The literature labeled “ New K eynesian” by Stanley 
F ischer [1988] provides choice-theoretic underpinnings to  this assumption.
A kerlof and Y ellen [1985], M ank iw  [1985], and Parkin  [1986] point out 
tha t fixed costs o f price adjustm ent (m enu costs) deter m onopolistically com- 
petitive firms from  adjusting prices to  tem porary  cost or dem and shocks. 
A ccording to  the envelope theorem , profits lost due to  changed m arket condi- 
tions are independent from  optim ally chosen prices up to  a first o rder approx- 
im ation. Hence, even small m enu costs m ay suffice to  prevent price adjustment.
A kerlof and Y ellen [1985], Ball and R ömer [1990], and Blanchard and 
K iyotaki [1987] present num erical examples o f  the size o f  profits (utility) lost 
in percent o f  revenue (real incom e) when prices rem ain fixed in response to a 
five or ten percent increase o f  m oney supply. M ost o f  the cases show a loss of 
less than one-tenth o f  one percent.
These papers share two closely related im plications. (1) Profits lost by a firm 
which does no t adjust its price to  a dem and shock are an  increasing function 
o f the fraction o f  price-adjusting firms. Price decisions are characterized by 
Strategie com plem entarity  (C ooper and Jo h n  [1988]). (2) As a consequence, in 
a stable N ash equilibrium  w ith a given size o f m enu costs, either all firms do 
or do not adjust their price. Therefore, aggregate supply is either perfectly price 
elastic o r perfectly inelastic.
I shall show th a t these results, as well as the size o f m enu costs required for 
price level stickiness, depend heavily upon the way in which the labor m arket 
is m odelled. M y starting  po in t is a  suitably m odified version o f  the B la n c h a r d  
and K iy o ta k i [1987] m odel. G iven a one percent increase o f  m oney supply, a 
fraction p o f firms adjusts their prices optim ally while o ther firms keep their 
prices fixed. I com pute the profits lost by these firm s in percent o f revenue. I 
then consider fixed wages, wages set on a m onopolistically com petitive m arket, 
m arket Clearing wages, and efficiency wages. The com puted loss o f  profits 
defines the size o f  m enu costs required to establish the m odel’s outcom e as a 
Nash equilibrium .
The results may be sum m arized as follows. (1) W ith m arket Clearing wages 
and identical preferences o f  househoulds, the loss o f profits o f  non-m axim izers 
is independent o f  w hether wages are set m onopolistically or com petitively. Yet, 
losses depend crucially upon  the elasticity o f labor supply w ith respect to  the 
real wage and the elasticity o f  substitu tion  between any two o f  the produced 
goods, which determ ines the degree o f  com petitiveness o f  the product m arket. 
For em pirically plausible values o f  bo th  elasticities, the m enu costs required to 
imply a certain  degree o f price level stickiness seem unrealistically high. (2) 
M oreover, there is a ränge o f  values o f bo th  elasticities such th a t m ore than  one 
Nash equilibrium  exists. In these cases prices and, hence, m enu costs are not 
uniquely determ ined. (3) W hen firms set wages in Order to  contro l labor pro- 
ductivity, the sensitivity o f w ork effort w ith respect to  the real wage has no 
significant effect upon  profits lost by non-m axim izers. Thus, the size o f menu 
costs required for fixed prices is m uch m ore plausible. (4) F ixed wages and 
efficiency wages imply Strategie com plem entarity. Unless m enu costs are above 
the level th a t would prevent all firms from  adjusting their prices, in a stable 
N ash equilibrium  either all firms do  or do  no t adjust prices. W ith flexible 
wages, profits lost m ay decrease w ith the fraction  o f  maxim izing firms and 
Strategie substitu tability  arises. The stable equilibrium  is the one in which a 
fraction o f firms does not ad just their prices. The elasticity o f  real G N P  with 
respect to  nom inal G N P  ranges in between zero and one and declines with the 
size o f  the dem and shock.
The next section provides an intuitive explanation  for these results. They are 
based on a general equilibrium  m odel set up in section 3. Section 4 analyzes 
equilibria w ith a fraction  o f  non-m axim izers. It reports the loss o f  profits 
incurred by non-m axim izing firms for a variety o f  param eter constellations. 
Section 5 offers concluding rem arks. The A ppendix covers technical details.
2. Profits Lost by Non-M aximizing Firms
Consider the price decision o f  a m onopolistically com petitive firm .1 The Solu­
tion to  this tex tbook  problem  is depicted in figure 1. Faced w ith dem and D0 and
1 I am grateful to the referee who suggested the following exposition.
m arginal costs M C 0 its optim al price is P0 . Let the dem and function shift to 
Position D y. The firm m aintains its price and  produces beyond the point where 
m arginal costs equal m arginal revenue. It incurs a loss o f  profits m easured by 
the area o f the hatched triangle. I shall label this the dem and-pull effect. In a 
general equilibrium  fram ew ork w ith a m oney supply shock, the shift o f the 
firm ’s dem and function depends upon the size o f  the shock and  upon  the price 
decisions o f  its com petitors. The m ore o f  them  decide to  ad just their price, 
the further Dx is to  the right o f  D0 . Thus, the dem and-pull effect is positively 
related to  the fraction  o f price-adjusting firms.
I f  m arginal costs shift upw ards in response to  the shock, which cannot 
happen in the yeom an farm er m odel o f  Ball and  R ömer [1990], the firm  suffers 
from  an additional loss m easured by the area o f  the shaded trapezoid. It 
depends upon the m odelling o f the labor m arket w hether this cost-push effect 
unam biguously increases w ith the fraction  o f  price-adjusting firms.
In  the efficiency wage m odel o f  A kerlof and  Y ellen [1985], labor produc- 
tivity increases w ith the real wage. I f  o ther firm s raise their prices the real wage 
o f  w orkers a t firms w ith fixed wages decreases. L abo r productiv ity  declines and 
m arginal costs increase. Thus, the cost-push effect is positively related to the 
fraction  o f price-adjusting firms.
Consider instead m arket Clearing wages and  a one precent increase in the 
m oney supply. A t constan t prices, o u tp u t m ust rise by one percent. I f  labor 
supply is sufficiently inelastic, nom inal wages m ust rise by m ore than one
percent. O n the o ther hand , if all firm s adjust prices, ou tpu t rem ains constant 
and nom inal wages increase by one percent. U nder these circum stances, the 
cost-push effect declines w ith the fraction  o f  price-adjusting firms.
3. The M odel
I consider an  econom y w ith a continuum  o f firms and households o f  equal size, 
indexed on the un it interval by j  and  h respectively.2 Each firm  produces a 
single good Yj using the labor services N h o f  all households. H ouseholds own 
the econom y’s given stock o f  m oney, M ,  receive wages and dividends and 
consume the production  o f  firms.
3.1 Households
The utility o f  household h is a function o f  its consum ption  bündle {Chj} j=0, its 
holdings o f  real cash balances, M h/P, and its labor supply N h. The specific 
functional form  is:
r _  1 f l  ■) e/(E- 1)
7 C K M J P r  ~e) ------- —  , Ch: =  \  J C i y  ™  dj
(1) Eß lo j
y : =  0-0(1 -  ö f - D ,  0 e  (0, 1), £ > 1 ,  ß > \ .
The param eter y norm alizes the m arginal utility of real incom e to  one. In the 
case of com petitive wage and price setting (or equal m ark-ups on bo th  markets), 
the term  (e — 1 )/(<: ß) secures a real wage of equal to  one. s and ß  are the focal 
Parameters of this paper. e is the elasticity of substitu tion  between any two 
consum ption goods. The case i: —► x  reflects a perfectly com petitive product 
m arket. l/(/? — 1) is the elasticity of labor supply w ith respect to  real wages. 6 
determ ines the fraction of the household’s budget spent on consum ption goods. 
This param eter has no influence upon  profits lost by non-maximizers.
The household’s budget constraint,
(2) } PjChj dj + M h < WhN h + Dh + M h ,
2 This is just for convenience. Nothing essential would change if I used [0, J] and [0, H] 
instead of [0, 1]. The original version of B l a n c h a r d  and K iy o t a k i  [1987] considers a 
countable set o f firms and households. This has the disadvantage that the function 
relating the loss o f profits o f non-maximizers to the fraction of maximizing firms is 
defined only on the set o f non negative rational numbers. With a continuum of firms, this 
function is defined on the interval [0,1],
states tha t expenditures on consum ption goods, j  Pj dj, together w ith end-of-
o
period cash balances, M h, m ust not exceed wage income, WhN h, dividends 
received, Dh, and beginning-of-period m oney holdings M h. Pj and  Wh denote the 
price of good j,  and the wage of labor Service of type h, respectively. In the case 
of a com petitive labor m arket, household h regards the wage as a param eter of 
its decision problem . If the labor m arket is m onopolistically com petitive, it sets 
the wage conditional on the labor dem and function. In any case, since Utility is 
additively separable in (Q , M J tf )  and  N h, consum ption  and m oney dem and are 
independent of the labor supply decision. Thus, for an arb itrarily  given budget 
Bk, the household’s dem and for good j  is
and its money dem and is
(3 b) M h = ( l - e ) B h,
with the price level defined by
(4) P  =
Substitution of equations (3) in to  equation  (1) yields utility as a function of the 
household’s real budget B J P  and its labor supply N h:
(5) Vk = ^ ~  —  N i  .
P eß
E quation (3 a) implies the m arket dem and for good j:
(6) Cj = ( f \ Ce ^ ,  B: = \ B „ d h .
3.2 Firms
The production  function o f  firm j  relates its o u tp u t Yj to  the inputs o f the 
different types o f labor services Njh according to
f 1  ^ aa 
m  ^ 1 • « > i .  « e <».•]■
The elasticity of substitu tion  between any two different types of labor services 
is a. L abor is hom ogeneous if a is the elasticity of production  with
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respect to  to ta l labor input as defined by the index form ula
The te r m -----------com bined with the corresponding term  of the household’s
a  (er — 1 )
utility function norm alizes the equilibrium  real wage. Cost m inim ization, min 
i
K f  = j  WhN jhdh subject to  equation  (7), determ ines the dem and for labor ser-
o
vices of type h by firm j:
( W h\ - °  fa ( o  -  \)  Y /a
(8) \ ° v
and implies the cost function
l  a (ff — 1) Y /31
(9) * , =  ----------- W,
where aggregate wages W  are given by
(10) W: = \ \  Wh1- ° d h ^ l ~a
o
The dem and for labor services of type h is the sum  of equation  (8) over all firms:
(1" Nl-(w) !(-VJW d‘-
3.3 Prices and Wages
The p roduct price o f  firm  j  maximizes profits, /] Y] — Kj,  subject to  the dem and 
function (6). The solution is:
e  f f  —  1 ( a ( a  —  1 )  N 1 “
,12a)
The Firm calculates its price via a constan t m ark-up  l/(e — 1) on m arginal costs. 
At this price, the firm produces as m uch as consum ers dem and:
(12b) Y j = C j .
If the labor services of different households are imperfect substitutes for each 
other, the wage set by household h maximizes the utility function (5) subject to
the labor dem and function (11). The wage is chosen via a constan t mark-up 
l/(ff — 1) on the m arginal disutility of labor:
03»)
P a — 1 £
At this wage, the household supplies as m uch labor as producers dem and: 
(13b) N sh = N *.
3.4 General Equilibrium
Firm s do  not differ from  one ano ther w ith respect to  their production  function 
and households share the same preferences. The d istribu tion  o f  w ealth among 
households is w ithout significance because o f  the separability  properties of the 
utility function. Therefore, in general equilibrium , all firm s set the same price 
and all households choose the sam e wage: P  =  Pj Vy'e [0, 1] and W  =  Wh 
VA e [0, 1]. F rom  equation  (6), dem and for good j  is 8B /P ,  and  all firms must 
produce the same am ount, Y =  Y j ' i J e  [0 ,1]. Likewise, equation  (13 a) implies 
tha t all households supply the same quan tity  o f  labor services, N  = N hV h e  
[0, 1]. Since the budget o f  all households m ust be
i i
B: = jPjYj +  M , M : = j M h ,
o o
equation  (6) and equation  (12 b) determ ine the m arket Clearing level of produc­
tion:
0 M
(14) Y, = ------------.
'  1 \ -  6 P
Elim inating Y, from  equation  (12a) by using equation  (11), W = W h , and 
Y  = Yj yields the aggregate dem and for labor services for type h, N k, as a 
function of the real wage. This function and  equations (13) imply the equilibri­
um real wage:
Wh W„ W  £ -  1
(15 a) co* "h h• —--  —-
P Pj P  £ a - 1
Perfect com petition in bo th  the product and the labor m arket, i.e. e, cr->oo, 
would yield a real wage equal to  one. H eterogenous products and  hom ogenous 
labor services w ould imply a real wage of less th an  one. Thus, the real wage is 
the smaller, the m ore com petitive the labor m arket is com pared  to  the product
market. The equilibrium  real wage and equations (13) determ ine labor supply 
and dem and:
(15 b) n ? = N *  = 1 .
Therefore, from  equation  (7), p roduction  of firm j  is
(15 c) Y,.* =
’ a(a — 1)
E quation (15c) and equation  (14) determ ine the equilibrium  price level,
a(<7 — 1) 0
(15 d) p* = p * = - ± -------- --------- M ,
G  1 — 0
which is directly p ropo rtional to  m oney supply.
3.5 Efficiency Wages
Suppose, for convenience, th a t labor services are hom ogenous and aggregate 
labor supply exceeds aggregate labor dem and in the ränge o f  real wages consid- 
ered below. The production  o f  firm  j  s  [0, 1] depends on labor services mea- 
sured in efficiency units, e jN j,  according to
(16) =  « 6 ( 0 , 1 ] .
Akerlof and Yellen [1985] assum e th a t the efficiency factor of one unit of 
physical labor input, ej, is the following function of the w orkers’ real wage:
f w \ (
(17) ej = - a  + b l - ^ J  , £ e (0, 1), a ,b  > 0 .
Wj is the wage paid by firm j, and P  is the price level defined by equation  (4). 
Firm  / s price Pj and wage offer W} maximize profits subject to  (17) and the 
dem and function (6). A Symmetrie equilibrium  determines prices and quantities 
as functions of the m odel’s param eters. The solutions are:
(18c)
e* \ e  -  1 e*
(18 d)
1 /  e <x>* 
<x \  £ — 1 e*
(18 e)
0
p *  =  p* = ------- M
J 1 - 0
Therefore, as in the model before, the price level is unit elastic w ith respect to 
m oney supply.
Suppose a lum p sum transfer to  households increases the stock o f  money from 
M 0 to = (1 +  m) M 0 , by m  x 100 percent. A t given prices and wages, 
aggregate dem and rises by m  x 100 percent. As a response, a fraction  p  o f  firms 
adjusts their prices optim ally taking in to  account the behavior o f  1 — p firms 
tha t do not change their prices bu t expand production  appropriately. The 
insight o f the early m enu costs literature is that, according to  the envelope 
theorem , the difference between the profits o f  price-adjusting firms (henceforth 
labeled maximizers) and the profits o f  firm s w ith fixed prices (the non-maximiz- 
ers) is o f second order (with respect to  a Taylor’s series expansion o f the profit 
function). But how large is this second o rder effect, e.g., in percent o f  revenue? 
Thus, w hat is the size o f fixed costs o f  price ad justm ent (m enu costs) necessary 
to  m ake 1 — p firms indifferent between the op tion  o f  raising their price and 
paying the m enu costs and th a t o f m ain ta in ing  their price and  saving the menu 
costs? This section provides an answ er tha t depends crucially upon the behav­
ior o f wages.
4.1 Fixed Wages
Let Pi, i 6 [0, p ] , denote the price o f m axim izing firms and Pk = P*, k  e ( p ; 1] the 
price o f non-m axim izing firms. W ith a fraction  p o f  m axim izing firms, the price 
level implied by defm ition (4) is :
4. Equilibria With M aximizing and Non-M aximizing Firms
(19)
and nom inal G N P  is:
(20) P Y =  f  W  di + } Pk Ykdk = p P ^  +  (1 -  p)Pk Yk
o  p
At prices /■ and respectively, bo th  maxim izers and  non-m axim izers produce 
as m uch as consum ers dem and. Thus, Yt and Yk m ust solve the two linear 
equations:
y, =  *  Y e P Y + M
(2 1 )
P )  P
It is easily verified tha t
( P \ ~ c 6 M
22 Y: =  M  ------ - — , j =  i, k,
j \ p ) \ - e p J
solves this system. Substituting Y) in equation  (12 a) by the right hand  side of 
equation (22) for j  = 1 yields
(23> p<~(^ r’~irwj r h M‘J •
1
n \  =  -
a +  fi(l — a.)
This equation  implicitly defines the profit m axim izing price 7? as a function of 
wages, m oney supply and the fraction of maximizers. It reflects the dem and-pull 
effect: it is increased dem and tha t m otivates firms faced with dim inishing re- 
turns to  scale to  raise their prices. If m arginal costs are constant, i.e. a = 1, the 
profit-m aximizing price is independent of the level of dem and, and equation (23) 
implies P( = Pk = P*.
E quation  (23) has a unique solution in Pt for given values of W, m, p, and the 
model’s param eters (see Appendix A). Taylor’s theorem  perm its an approxim ate 
solution:
1 — a
(24) P ~  Pk + ---------------------------------------------Pkm .
rx + e(l — a) — p(£ — 1) (1 — a)
Apply Taylor’s theorem  to the profit function 
to get
An -.=n(pk) -  77(ij) =  n'(Pi)(Pk -  7?) +  ^n " (m pk -  /?)2
1 £ — 1 
= ~ ~ P i Yi  (Pk -~Pd2 ,
2 an
where II'(P^ and II" {Pi) denote the first and  second derivative of the profit 
function evaluated a t JJ. N ote tha t Pt = Pk a t m =  0 and, hence, II' (i-) =  0. 
E lim inate (Pk — P^2 using (24) and divide by Pi Yl = Pk Yk . The ensuing formula
A l l  1 e — 1
(25) -------
Pk Yk 2 a n
1 — a
(a +  £(1 — a) — p(e — 1) (1 — a)
2
m2
approxim ates the loss of profits in percent of revenue incurred by non-maximiz- 
ers. This loss is a function of a ,e ,p  and m. F o rm ula (25) (and m ore general 
Appendix A) proves th a t the dem and-pull effect is an  increasing function of the 
fraction of m aximizers p. The underlying econom ic reasoning is this: the price 
level increases w ith p. F irm s keeping their nom inal prices fixed experience 
decreasing relative prices. Consequently, they produce the further beyond the 
point at which m arginal revenue covers m arginal costs, the m ore other firms 
decide to  adjust prices.
Table 1 reports the results of num erical examples. F o r a one percent increase 
in money supply it displays the loss of profits in percent of (orginal) revenue 
and, in parentheses, the associated percentage increase of aggregate employ- 
ment. p = 0(p  =  1) m arks the case where all firms bu t one keep their prices fixed 
(adjust prices). The figures are derived from  solutions of equation  (23). Especial- 
ly for high values of £, there is a significant difference between results derived 
from the approxim ate form ula (25) and  those based on solutions of equa­
tion (23). The values of param eters w ith no obvious influence, nam ely 0, er, and 
ß, were chosen for convenience.
The loss of profits declines w ith the elasticity of p roduction  with respect to 
to ta l labor input, a, and rises with the elasticity of substitu tion  w ith respect to 
any two of the consum er goods. L abor’s share in G N P , which is no t smaller 
than  0.65, provides a proxy of a. Em pirically plausible m a rk -u p s3 favor e =  7.7. 
The respective entries of table 1 are quite small, 0.008 (a =  0.75, e = 1.1) percent 
of revenue being the biggest. Even in a highly com petitive p roduct market, 
£ =  20.1, the loss is less than  0.15 percent. These results, so far, confirm  the 
argum ent th a t even small m enu costs m ight suffice to  prevent price adjustment.
4.2 Flexible Wages
Suppose wages respond to  increased labor dem and. Then, wages satisfy equa­
tion (13 a) in the case o f  a m onopolistically com petitive labor m arket. I f  the 
labor m arket is perfectly com petitive, wages satisfy equation  (13 a) w ith the
term  —- — replaced by 1. Again, sym m etry implies W h = W  V h e [0, 1]. Hence, 
(7— 1
3 S e e ,  e .g . ,  H a l l  [1988] a n d  S c h e r e r  [1980].
Table 1
a p e £ £ e
2.0 5.0 7.7 20.1
0.25 0.00 0.006 0.011 0.013 0.014
(4.06) (4.06) (4.06) (4.06)
0.25 0.008 0.017 0.020 0.024
(3.58) (3.84) (3.92) (4.01)
0.50 0.011 0.029 0.037 0.050
(2.96) (3.48) (3.67) (3.92)
0.75 0.014 0.060 0.92 0.161
(2.14) (2.80) (3.12) (3.69)
1.00 0.020 0.191 0.499 4.253
(1.00) (1.00) (1.00) (1.00)
0.500 0.00 0.002 0.003 0.004 0.005
(2.01) (2.01) (2.01) (2.01)
0.25 0.002 0.005 0.006 0.008
(1.83) (1.91) (1.94) (1.98)
0.50 0.002 0.008 0.010 0.015
(1.61) (1-76) (1.83) (1.93)
0.75 0.003 0.013 0.022 0.044
(1.34) (1.51) (1.61) (1.81)
1.00 0.004 0.031 0.076 0.556
(1.00) (1.00) (1.00) (1.00)
0.650 0.00 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002
(1.54) (1.54) (1.54) (1.54)
0.25 0.001 0.002 0.003 0.004
(1.44) (1.48) (1.49) (1.52)
0.50 0.001 0.003 0.004 0.007
(1.31) (1.38) (1.42) (1.48)
0.75 0.001 0.005 0.008 0.019
(1.17) (1.24) (1.29) (1.40)
1.00 0.001 0.009 0.022 0.147
(1.00) (1.00) (1.00) (1.00)
0.75 0.00 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001
(1.34) (134) (1.34) (1.34)
0.25 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.002
(1.27) (1.29) (1.30) (1.32)
0.50 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.004
(1.19) (122) (1.25) (129)
0.75 0.000 0.002 0.004 0.010
(1.10) (1.14) (1.16) (1.22)
1.00 0.001 0.003 0.008 0.048
(1.00) (1.00) (1.00) (1.00)
ß =  7.7; 9 =  0.5; m =  0.01; (t — e
dem and for labor service o f type h is
a ( e r - l )  Y /3t / / a ( f f - l )  Y'*
(26) N*  =  p Y j  +  (1 -  p ) ( ^ — -'T t
The first term  of the right hand  side of equation  (26) is the labor dem and of 
m axim izing firms, the second term  is labor dem anded by non-maximizers. 
Replacing N h in equation  (13 a) by the right hand  side of equation  (26), and 
substituting for Yt and Yk from  equations (21), yields W  as a function of This 
function can be used to  elim inate W  in equation  (23). The ensuing equation, 
w ritten in implicit form, determ ines the optim al price of m axim izing firms as a 
function of p, m, and the form er optim al price P* =  Pk:
(27)
(T 1 —
X (pPi~cla +  (1  -  p)Fk“ E/T (/,_1”t - P i -
Appendix B proves tha t a solution of equation  (27) exists. Yet, there may be 
m ore than  one solution. F igure 1 illustrates this possibility for quite plausible 
values of the m odel’s param eters. The reason for this am biguity is the behavior 
of labor dem and, equation  (26), w ith respect to  the price of maxim izing firms. 
Consider Pt increasing the interval [P*, x  ). The relative price of non-maximizers 
declines steadily, shifting p roduct dem and from  m axim izing to  non-maximizing 
firms. Initially, planned lay-offs at m axim izing firms overcom pensate planned 
hiring by non-m axim izing firms. The dem and for labor services of type h de­
clines. W hen the maxim izers’ share of the product m arket has becom e small, 
planned hiring outweighs p lanned lay-offs, and labor dem and rises (see Ap­
pendix C). If the elasticity of labor supply with respect to  the real wage is small, 
there m ay be three equilibria in the labor m arket. Since the loss of profits of 
non-m axim izers increases w ith the price difference Pk — Pt, m enu costs required 
to establish the equilibrium  labeled C in figure 2 are noticeably greater than 
those necessary to  establish equilibrium  A.
The results sum m arized in table 2 are based -  if necessary -  on the optimal 
price tha t is closest to the original price. A variety of num erical experiments 
confirms the conjecture th a t profits lost decline w ith the elasticity of production 
with respect to  labor input, ot. The figures in table 2 were calculated with 
a =  0.75. The values of ß  and e are essentially those used by B a l l  and Römer 
[1990] and B la n c h a r d  and K iy o ta k i [1987]. The rem aining, inessential 
param eters were chosen to  imply vv* =  1 and N*  =  1. As in table 1, the numbers 
in parentheses are the percentage increase of em ploym ent when m oney supply 
rises by one percent and when a fraction 1 — p of firms keeps their prices fixed.
Table 2 reveals a variety of cases where profits lost are significant in size. If 
all firms but one increase prices, aggregate p roduction  and em ploym ent do not
Pi
a= 0 .6 5  (3=7.70 e=ct=7.70 p=0.50 
Figure 2
change. The wage of the single non-m axim izer increases by one percent and is 
independent of ß. Even in this case and for e =  7.7, the non-m axim izers loss 
(0.126 percent of revenue) is m ore than  fifteen times larger than  with constant 
wages (0.008 percent of revenue). If the fraction of non-m axim izers is greater 
than zero, their losses increase w ith ß. Em pirically, the elasticity of labor supply 
with respect to  the real wage, \ / ( ß  — 1), is sm all4, im plying a ß  not smaller than 
7.7. C om bined with e =  7.7, in two ou t of five cases profits lost are bigger than 
0.5 percent o f revenue. M enu costs of abou t 0.5 percent of revenue, however, 
seem unrealistically large.
Since the wage increase is independent of a, the figures of table 2 would not 
change if a perfectly com petitive labor m arket were assum ed rather than a 
m onopolistically com petitive labor m arket.
Table 2 shows th a t there is no m ono ton  relation  between profits lost and the 
fraction of maximizers. The underlying logic is th a t the m arket Clearing wage 
may decline with the fraction of maximizers. To see this, consider the polar cases 
p = 0 and  p  =  1. In the first case the price level does not change and production  
rises by one percent, requiring nom inal wages to  rise by (ß — l) /a  percent. If 
p = 1, prices and wages rise by one percent. Thus, if ß  is greater than  1 +  a, the 
wage increase for small p exceeds one percent and m ust decrease as p approach-
4 S e e , e .g . ,  K i l l i n g s w o r t h  [ 1 9 8 3 ],
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Table 2
jjmriE
a p £ £ £ £
2.0 5.0 7.7 20.1
1.2 0.00 0.001 0.003 0.003 0.004
(1.34) (1.34) (1.34) (1.34)
0.25 0.002 0.004 0.005 0.008
(1.19) (1.24) (1.27) (1.30)
0.50 0.002 0.007 0.010 0.0150
(0.98) (1.09) (1.15) (1.24)
0.75 0.004 0.016 0.024 0.047
(0.64) (0.80) (0.90) (1.10)
1.00 0.008 0.055 0.126 0.858
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
2.0 0.00 0.008 0.021 0.026 0.034
(1.34) (1.34) (1.34) (1.34)
0.25 0.008 0.026 0.035 0.054
(1.00) (1.11) (1.17) (1.26)
0.50 0.008 0.032 0.050 0.097
(0.67) (0.83) (0.93) (1.13)
0.75 0.008 0.042 0.076 0.221
(0.34) (0.47) (0.57) (0.86)
1.00 0.008 0.055 0.126 0.858
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
7.7 0.00 0.261 0.635 0.786 1.020
(1.34) (1.34) (1.34) (1.34)
0.25 0.060 0.288 0.519 1.561
(0.48) (0.67) (0.81) (1.26)
0.50 0.025 0.146 0.310 2.154
(0.21) (0.32) (0.42) (1.00)
0.75 0.014 0.085 0.191 1.498
(0.08) (0.12) (0.16) (0.42)
1.00 0.008 0.055 0.126 0.858
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
20.1 0.00 2.074 4.825 5.867 7.399
(1.34) (1.34) (1.34) (1.34)
0.25 0.104 0.726 2.138 698.6
(0.23) (0.39) (0.60) (11.32)
0.50 0.031 0.210 0.532 1.986E +  04
(0.08) (0.14) (0.20) (27.67)
0.75 0.015 0.097 0.229 4.326E +  06
(0.03) (0.05) (0.06) (60.86)
1.00 0.008 0.055 0.126 0.858
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
a =  0.75; 6 = 0.5; m = 0.01; a  =  e
es one. In th a t case the cost-push effect opposes the dem and-pull effect and  may 
dom inate or com e to  dom inate the la tter (see figure 3, Panel (b) and Panel (c), 
respectively). O nly if the dem and-pull effect is strong  enough from the begin- 
ning, do profits lost steadily increase w ith the fraction of firms adjusting prices 
(see figure 3, Panel (a)).
C onsider the case show n in Panel (a) of figure 3. Suppose there are costs of 
adjusting prices of size mc. At po in t B, each firm is indifferent between the 
op tion  of keeping its price fixed and saving the m enu costs and the alternative 
of raising its price and paying the m enu costs. Yet, since the losses of non-m ax- 
imizers increase with the fraction of maximizers, the N ash equilibrium  at B is 
unstable. A small increase of p raises profits lost above the m enu costs and 
triggers a positive feed-back effect th a t finally induces all firms to  raise prices. 
Likewise, a small decrease of p causes all firms to keep their prices fixed. W ithin 
a ränge of m oney supply shocks where m enu costs are sm aller than  profits lost 
at p = 1, the aggregate supply function is either perfectly price elastic o r perfect- 
ly inelastic. The interdependence between the decision of one fraction of firms 
to change its price and the decision of o ther firms to  change their price is an 
example of Strategie com plem entarity  in the sense defined by C ooper and John
Stable N ash equilibria require a negative feed-back effect, i.e., Strategie substi- 
tutability. This occurs if the cost-push effect outweighs the dem and-pull effect.
(Arij/P jYj)* 1 oo
[1988],
m c
A
0 P
a  =  0 . 7 5  ( 3 = 1 . 2 0  £ =  5 . 0 0  m  =  0 . 0 1  
Figure 3 a
(A n /P jY jM o o
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Figure 3 b
(ADj/P jYj)+ 1 00
0
a  = 0 . 7 5  (3 =  2 . 8 0  £ =  5 . 0 0  m  =  0 . 0 1  
Figure 3 c
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In Panel (b) o f figure 3 there is only one equilibrium , the po in t labeled B. At A, 
profits lost if all bu t one firm m aintain  their prices exceed the m enu costs mc. 
At C m enu costs are greater than  profits lost if all but one firm raise prices. The 
N ash  equilibrium  B is stable. A small decrease of p raises profits lost above 
m enu costs and other firms find it profitable to  adjust prices, offsetting the initial 
decrease of p. Profits lost increase w ith the size of the money supply shock. The 
curve ABC in Panel (b) shifts upw ard if m rises. Thus, for given costs of price 
adjustm ent, the fraction of price adjusting firms increases with the size of the 
m oney supply shock. The aggregate supply function exhibits a decreasing price 
elasticity.
The interm ediate case of Panel (c) shows two stable N ash equilibria: points 
labeled A and C. E ither none or a large fraction of firms adjust prices. B is an 
unstable equilibrium . D  is not an equilibrium , at all.
4.3 Efficiency Wages
Table 3 displays the results o f  num erical examples o f the efficiency wage model. 
A ppendix D  covers the technical details o f  this model. There is a unique 
optim al price P{ for each fraction  o f  maxim izers, and hence no am biguity with 
respect to  profits lost. The form ula approxim ating profits lost in percent of 
(original) revenue,
(28)
A n
P Yj ‘ j
' ( e -  l)(a + e(l - a ) )  , a(e -  1)(1 -  f)
1 -  a
ot + e(l — a) — p[a + (e — 1)(1 — a)]
m
indicates tha t the param eters of the effort function (17) have no influence on 
profits lost. A variety of num erical experim ents confirms this conjecture. They 
also show tha t the negative im pact of £ is quite small. This adm its setting a, b, 
and £ to  imply an equilibrium  real wage and an equilibrium  effort level of one.
F orm ula  (28) is equivalent to  form ula (25) if p = 0. In this case the price level 
does no t change and  m axim izing firms are no t forced to  offer higher wages that 
w ould prevent the effort level from  falling. Consequently, the efficiency model 
is equivalent to  the constan t wage m odel if no firm but one adjusts its price.
Table 3 reveals th a t the efficiency wage m odel implies noticeably smaller 
losses than  the m arket Clearing wage model. The largest num ber occurring for 
a =  0.75 is abou t 0.9 percent of revenue (p =  1 and e =  20.1). If the product 
m arket is less com petitive, e.g. e =  7.7, it is only for p close to  one th a t losses 
exceed one tenth  of a percent.
Table 3 provides evidence of the fact tha t profits lost increase with the fraction 
of maximizers. As in the fixed wage m odel, this can be show n to hold indepen­
dent of the param eter values chosen. Hence, Strategie com plem entarity  exits,
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Table 3
jjmnE
2.0 5.0 7.7 20.1
0.00 0.002 0.003 0.004 0.005
(2.01) (2.01) (2.01) (2.01)
0.25 0.002 0.005 0.006 0.008
(1.89) (1.95) (1.97) (1-99)
0.50 0.004 0.010 0.012 0.017
(1.64) (1.80) (1.86) (1.95)
0.75 0.007 0.024 0.034 0.056
(1.14) (1.44) (1.58) (1.82)
1.00 0.016 0.127 0.315 2.463
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
0.00 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001
(1.34) (1.34) (1.34) (1.34)
0.25 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002
(1.30) (1.31) (1.32) (1.33)
0.50 0.001 0.003 0.004 0.005
(1.20) (1.24) (1.27) (1.30)
0.75 0.002 0.007 0.010 0.017
(0.93) (1.04) (1.10) (1.22)
1.00 0.009 0.057 0.128 0.860
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
0 = 0.5; a — 1; b =  2; c =  0.5; m = 0.01
and menu costs of a given size imply tha t stable equilibria have either none or 
all firms adjusting prices.
5. Conclusion
Fixed costs o f price adjustm ent can prevent firms from  changing prices in 
response to  an aggregate dem and shock. This is beyond doubt. But, I believe, 
the really im portan t question is w hether they can explain the observed correla- 
tion between real and nom inal G N P, which is neither zero nor one. This paper 
shows tha t the answer depends critically on  the behavior o f  wages.
Fixed wages as well as efficiency wages imply tha t profits lost by firms that 
do not adjust their prices are quite small. In  m ost o f  the cases studied, menu 
costs o f  acceptable size could prevent price adjustm ent. In bo th  models the 
Strategie interdependence between price adjusting and non-adjusting firms is 
com plem entary. Hence, either none or all firms adjust their prices. Any inter- 
mediate case is unlikely to  be observed.
This does no t hold true w ith wages th a t are set either m onopolistically or at 
m arket Clearing levels. If  labor supply is sufficiently inelastic w ith respect to the
real wage, Strategie substitu tability  m ay arise. W hat will be observed are equi- 
libria in which a fraction  o f  firms adjusts prices while o ther firms keep their 
prices fixed. The elasticity o f real G N P  w ith respect to  nom inal G N P  takes 
values in between zero and one and declines w ith the size o f the dem and shock. 
F urtherm ore, real wages are procyclical, which is in line w ith em pirical evi- 
dence.5 U nfortunately , and especially w ith a sufficiently com petitive product 
m arket, m enu costs required to  imply these results seem unrealistically large. 
The conclusion is som ew hat startling: the em pirically relevant outcom e re- 
quires unrealistically large m enu costs.
Zusammenfassung
Ich untersuche die Bedeutung der Lohnbildung für Preisniveaustarrheiten im 
Rahm en des M enu Costs Ansatzes. Die N om inallöhne sind flexibel und die 
Zahl der U nternehm en, welche ihre Preise an N achfrageschocks anpassen, ist 
variabel. F ü r em pirisch plausible Param eterw erte en tsteht strategische Substi- 
tu tionalität zwischen den U nternehm en. In diesem Fall ist die Preiselastizität 
der aggregierten G üterangebotsfunktion  weder null noch unendlich, aller­
dings sind m it dieser S ituation  unrealistisch große M enu Costs verbunden. Bei 
Effizienzlöhnen und  starren  N om inallöhnen passen entw eder alle U nterneh­
men die Preise an oder halten sie konstan t. In beiden Fällen sind die für starre 
Preise erforderlichen M enu C osts sehr klein.
Appendix
A ) Existence o f  Solutions o f  Equation  (23)
Let
/  e < 7 - 1  Y V * ( < r - i )  o Y 1-3'”' , ,,,, ,(Al )  iA (J? ) := ---------------- W  —--------- --------- M j  p<e-i)(i-*)* _  j>'
£ —  1 (7 <7 1 - 0
with n defined in (23). This function is continuously differentiable in Pt. It is 
positively valued at =  P*,
(A 2) if/(Pt =  P*) = P* (1 +  m)a  ~J)'1 -  1 >  0 for m >  0 .
and approaches — co as oo. Thus, there m ust be at least one P* e (P*, oc)
5 More recent empirical papers on this subject are G a r m a n  and R i c h a r d s  [1992] and 
So l o n , B a r s k y  and P a r k e r  [1994],
solving equation  (23). At P* the derivative of ip (/)) is 
lp'(Pi*) = S — 1 — Sil < 0  ,
(A3)
/ V _ £ i P J i d i  
s ' = P \ ^ j  = ° p Y  E t° ’ /*] f°r Pi e  [P*, QO),
where s is the m arket share of maximizers. Thus, ip (/*) cuts the abzissa only once 
and P f  is unique.
B) Zeros o f  Function (27)
It is easily seen tha t the function defined by equation  (27) is positively valued at 
Pf =  P* and approaches — oo as Pf-> oo. Hence (27) has at least one root 
P* e  (P*, oo). The derivative of (27) evaluated a t P* is
f  (P(*) =  * ([«  +  (e -  l ) (ß  -  a)]s -  e{ß -  i)ö(Pt *) -  (1/tt)) ,
(Bl )
{Pi
P (P * ) - ‘I* +  (1 _  p)(P*)-c/* 1,
(P*)=/"
1 - P .
for ij*  e [P*, oo).
This expression, with 5 as in (A3), is assuredly negative if ß = 1 but may be 
positive if ß  is large. In this case, there m ust be at least three roots of i/'fP;).
C) Properties o f  Function (26)
Substitute Y) and Yk in equation  (26) by the right hand  side of (22). Since the 
price level defined in equation  (19) is also a function of Ph the result,
tf*(JJ):=  ( p J T £/“ +  (l - P ) J T E/“)
1/ a
(CI)
^a(<7 — 1) 0 Y '* ,
X I - -------- -------- - M 0(l +  m) | p ' - 1»/“ .
er 1 — 0 /
portrays m arket dem and for labor of type h as a function of P(. At Pf =  P*, 
(C 2) = P*) =  N U  1 +  m)1/a >  N f  .
Furtherm ore,
(C 3) lim N ^ P J  =  (1 +  m)llx( 1 -  p)<““ 1)/0,N * >  =  P*) >  AT* .
Pi -> 00
The derivative of (CI )  at  Pt = P* is
d N J P  = P*) p N ?
(C4) < 0 .
dP, a P*
Thus, when Pt departs from  P* and approaches infinity, labor dem and first 
declines but finally increases beyond Afh(P; =  P*).
D) Equilibria with Maximizers and Non-M aximizers in the 
Efficiency Wage Model
The profit maxim izing price of firm i is
£ W*
( Dl )  =  ------- —l~ ( e * N j)1 ,
£ — 1 e*
where Wt* = w*P. The production  function implies
e * N ( = (oiYi )ll\
and Y< is given by (22) for j  = i. Hence, ( Dl ) ,  the production  function, and 
equation  (22) imply
(D 2) = j  L _ _ M 0( l + m ) J  P ^ ~  ^ - »  _  Pt .
This function, with n as defined in (23), determ ines the optim al price of m axim iz­
ers. At F; =  P*, it is positively valued and  approaches — oo as Pj->oo. Hence, 
at least one roo t P* e (P*, oo) exists. The derivative of (D 2) evaluated at 
Pt = Pt* is
(D3) ^ ( p .  = p*) = s -  l - ( l  - a ) 7 t < 0 ,
with s as defined in (A4), proving the uniqueness of Pf.
A pproxim ately, the difference between the optim al price and the price of non- 
maximizers as derived from  (D2) is
(D 4 ) Pi ~  Pk ~  [a +  E(i _  «)] _  p [a  +  (£ _  i ) ( i  _  a )] PkTn '
Since Wt = w*P  the difference between the optim al wage and the wage of non- 
maximizers is
p (  1 —  a)
(D 5) W i - W k ~ - -------------------- —---------------------------- - Pkm .
[a +  e(1 — a)] — p [a  +  (e — 1)(1 — a)]
Taylor’s theorem  and the optim ality  of the form er price P* = P,. and wage 
W*  =  Wk imply
( D 6 )  A l l  ~  ^(Pj — Pk , Wi - W k)
where
( D 7 )
£ -  1 Yj* 
an P?
and
( D 8 ) nww (1 - < ) N j  W *
are the second derivative of the profit function with respect to price and wage, 
respectively, both evaluated at m =  0. The mixed second partial derivatives of the 
profit function can be shown to be zero at m = 0. Insert (D7) and (D8) into (D6), 
consider F1PW = I I WP =  0, and divide by P* Yj* in order to get equation (28).
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